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Universities have recently been subjected to increased demands for
judicial scrutiny of the conduct of their affairs, especially in the area
of procedural review. Much of the academic writing has concentrated
on these developments as they affect the academic staff of the
university.' This article seeks to redress the balance by considering
procedural fairness in the context of university decision-making as it
affects students. A study of university decision-making provides a
useful framework for a more general consideration of the new
approach to "procedural fairness" with its emphasis on balancing the
nature of the decisions against the competing interests of those
involved to assess what specific procedures are required in a
particular context.
Universities are complex institutions performing a number of
functions in their relations with their student population. Each
university has its own institutional structure and differs in the way
that it distributes these functions among the various university
committees and bodies.2 In principle, there seem to be three broad
categories of decisions affecting students, reflecting the different aims
of a university.
First, as an academic institution, one of the primary aims of a
university is the promotion of knowledge and learning through
*B.A. (Cantab.) LL.M. (Dalhousie); Lecturer in Law, University of East Anglia.
1. See for example Vining and McPhillips, New Developments in Natural Justice:
Their Application to Tenure Decisions (1982), 27 McGill L.J. 330 and works cited
therein. For an earlier article focussing on the position of the student, see Lewis
"The Legal Nature of a University and the Student University Relationship" (1983)
15 Ottawa Law Review and 49.
2. For a broad sketch of the structure of United Kingdom universities see the Report
of the Committee on Higher Education (London HMSO 1963) chaired by Lord
Robbins, chapter 3, "Internal Government of Universities". For the position in
Canada see the Duff-Berdahl Report on University Government in Canada
(published by the University of Toronto press, 1966).
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teaching and research.' Integral to this is the system of grading
examinations, papers and other requirements for the awarding of
degrees. Evaluations of this sort are highly subjective. In order to
offer some objective check on this essentially subjective process,
universities may establish a marks appeal procedure. Decisions of this
nature are obviously of vital importance to the student, affecting as
they do, the quality of a student's degree - or the more basic matter
of whether a student is to be awarded a degree at all after perhaps
years of work.
On a different plane, universities normally possess a large corpus of
regulations governing the requirements of degree programmes. Under
such regulations students may seek decisions exempting them from
certain requirements, recognising work at other institutions, allowing
additional attempts at examinations and so on. Some of these
decisions involve students establishing facts that bring them within
certain regulations or demonstrating why regulations should be
waived in a particular case. They differ in essence from the evaluation
decisions but again may determine whether a student is to receive a
degree or what requirements he will have to meet to do so. Thus there
is a broad range of decisions to be taken that may differ in nature but
all of which have serious consequences for the individual student
concerned.
Second, a university also has its own code of ethics designed to
protect its academic integrity. Plagiarism and cheating are usually
treated as academic offences. Alleged violations have to be
investigated and sanctions imposed. These may range from denying a
student credit for a particular course to expulsion or suspension from
the university. In addition, a finding of plagiarism may carry a moral
stigma, often making it more difficult to pursue a career at another
institution or otherwise affect a student after leaving university.
Third, as a largely self-regulating community where a large
number of people work and often live together, universities must
regulate the conduct of their members, at least in so far as this is
necessary to ensure an orderly environment for the pursuit of its
3. For a general discussion of the university as an institution see The Discipline of an
Academic Community (1968) prepared by the University of Bradford branch of the
Association of University Teachers, paragraphs 8 to 15. See also Hurtubise and
Rowatt Report on The University Society and Government, esp. at chapter 3,
"Nature and Functions of the University" (published by the University of Ottawa
press, 1970).
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primary academic aims. This involves the authorities adjudicating on
alleged violations and imposing sanctions where appropriate. These
sanctions may range from reprimands and small fines to suspension
or expulsion - which of course deprives students in effect of the
means of pursuing their education.
Some of these decisions lend themselves more easily to certain
types of procedure. For example, a disciplinary matter involving
questions of disputed fact and witness credibility might be more
suitably dealt with in an oral hearing with cross-examination. On the
other hand, a grade appeal which is essentially subjective in nature
fits far less comfortably in this mould.
The interest of the student lies in membership of a university and
obtaining an academic qualification. The value of this interest has
probably increased in recent years.
Employment may often depend upon possession of a degree which
may be a sine qua non for some professions. Students have been
judicially described as "potential graduates and potential holders of
degrees which could prove advantageous in professional or commer-
cial life".' They also enjoy access to the considerable non-academic
benefits of university life in its associations, facilities and activities.
Consequently, decisions depriving a student of his position or affect-
ing his degree are very significant ones. This much has been expressly
recognized by British university administrators:
Disciplinary matters have in one sense assumed increasing impor-
tance as the value of a degree as a starting point has grown, and a
decision to suspend or even in some cases to send down a student is
regarded in a much more serious light than it would be a genera-
tion ago. 5
While these words were uttered in relation to disciplinary matters
they can be applied with equal force to the whole gamut of university
decisions.
The university has legitimate interests in ensuring speed, efficiency
and low cost in it administration. At the very least, university decisi-
on-makers cannot be expected to operate in a manner that detracts
seriously from the primary aims of the institution. It would not be
4. Per Blain J. in R. v. Aston University Senate exp. Roffey, [1969] 2 Q.B. 538, at
p. 556; Donaldson J. also stresses the value of student status at p. 552.
5. Joint Statement of Vice-Chancellors and Principals and the National Union of
Students, reproduced in Volume 11 of the Select Committee on Education and
Science. Report on Student Relations (1969), at p. 83 paragraph 13.
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realistic, for example, to require a full meeting of a large body like a
university senate to take every decision that might affect students.
The time consumed will have to be taken from teaching and research.
The senate itself will have to curtail broader policy debates to
accommodate these individual petitions. The cost of the bureaucracy
to service such meetings may be high, leaving less resources for
academic purposes. Even smaller committees required to hold oral
hearings take up the time of their members and use resources. Some
decisions may justify the expense; other may not.
This article considers first the content of the right to a fair hearing
within the university context. An attempt is made to identify the
characteristics of the different types of university decision, and the
interests of the student and the university. These factors are then
balanced against each other to assess what procedures are approp-
riate in a particular context.
Then the rules against bias and delegation of decision-making
power are considered. Particular problems arise in universities
because of the nature of their institutional structure. Initially, power
is normally vested in a Senate or Board of Governors and then
delegated to faculties who in turn delegate the powers to committees.
Cross-membership of committees, faculty and university bodies,
raises special problems about bias.
Finally, potential barriers to a student seeking judicial review of a
university decision are examined. Particular attention is focussed on
an emerging duty to exhaust internal remedies before seeking judicial
review.
II. Academic Decisions
These decisions can be subdivided into two broad categories. First,
there are those decisions which are 'purely' academic in the sense
that they involve a subjective evaluation of the academic merit of a
student's work. Secondly there are those decisions which involve
objective facts in some way - whether because a student brings
forward material to justify the application or waiver of a faculty rule
or policy or because there is a dispute over facts when the university
applies its regulations on degree requirements to the student.
In the first category, which involves the marking of examination
scripts or the assessment of the academic capability of the student,
the university has a legitimate claim to expertise. The arranging of
examinations and the setting of standards is not an area where judi-
cial supervision is particularly appropriate. The fact that a decision to
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fail a student can seriously affect his academic career -and perhaps
lead to his exclusion from university or the refusal of a degree - can
do nothing to alter the highly subjective nature of the decisions. Any
system of objective checks by means of grade appeals would seem
best left to the university.
The courts have consistently refused to involve themselves in
reviewing purely academic matters such as the method or accuracy of
an academic evaluation. In the United Kingdom, the courts have
usually denied themselves jurisdiction on the grounds that all matters
relating to academic assessment are a purely internal matter falling
within the sole jurisdiction of the university visitor.6 The visitor is a
university functionary having jurisdiction over the "internal arran-
gements and dealings with regard to the government and manage-
ment of the house, of the domus [or] of the institution". 7 As long ago
as 1864, Kindersley V.C. refused to adjudicate on a displute arising
out of the regulations governing the marking of the LL.D. examina-
tions in the University of London, stressing that:
The holding of examinations and the conferring of degrees being
one, if not the main or only object of this University, all the
regulations, that is the construction of all the regulations and the
carrying into effect of all those regulations... all those are regula-
tions of the domus: they are regulations clearly in my mind com-
ing within the jurisdiction, and the exclusive jurisdiction, of the
Visitor. 8
The same justification for not adjudicating on a dispute arising from
a student's failure to pass two examinations was used as recently as
1978 by Megarry V.C. 9 In Australia this reluctance has gone as far as
refusing mandamus to compel a Visitor to adjudicate on such a
dispute, as "it would be undesirable that his function should be
capable of being called in aid by any student who might be dissatis-
6. For thorough discussions of the institution of the Visitor, see Bridge: Keeping the
Peace in Universities: The Role of the Visitor (1970), 86 L.Q.R. 531; P.M. Smith:
The Exclusive Jurisdiction of the University Visitor (1981), 97 L.Q.R. 610; for the
position in Canada, see Quellette: Le Controle Judicaire sur r Universite (1970), 48
Can. Bar Rev. 631; McConnell: The Errant Professoriate: An Inquiry into Academic
Due Process (1973), 37 Sask. L. Reve. 250; Ricquier: The University Visitor (1977),
4 Dal. L.J. 647.
7. Per Kindersley V.C. in Thomson v. University of London (1864), 33 L.J. (Ch.)
625 at p. 634.
8/ Ibid., at p. 634.
9. In Patel v. University of Bradford Senate, [1978] 1 W.L.R. 1488 Ch.; aff. [1979]
1 W.L.R. 1066 (C.A.).
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fied with the conduct or result of his examinations"."'
While the justification put forward for judicial reticence might be
their lack of jurisdiction, at the heart of the matter lies a realisation
that the courts lack the ability or expertise to supervise academic
assessments. In Thorne v. University of London where the court sim-
ilarly deferred to the jurisdiction of the Visitor in an action, com-
plaining of negligence in the marking of examinations Diplock L.J.
may have been closer to the truth when he said:
The High Court does not act as a court of appeal from university
examiners; and speaking for my own part, I am very glad that it
declines jurisdiction. "
The Canadian courts have displayed a similar reluctance to
become involved in purely academic assessments. In the words of
Weatherston J. in Re Polten and the Governing Council of the Uni-
versity of Toronto:
[T]he standards for a degree, and the assessment of a student's
work, are so clearly vested in the university the courts have no
power to intervene merely because it thought that the standards
are too high, or that the student's work was inaccurately
assessed. 2
The position in Canada is complicated by the fact that most uni-
versities have themselves adopted a grades appeal system which
allows a student to challenge a particular grade. This inevitably
involves the courts in deciding whether the procedures followed in a
grade appeal are adequate, although Weatherston J. has made it
clear that the courts will not be drawn into review of the methods or
accuracy of the academic assessment. The issue was considered in Re
Polten " where a student challenged a decision to refuse him a doc-
toral degree, claiming that he had not been present at an appeal
hearing and had not been given the opportunity to defend his thesis
10. Per Davidson J. in ex p. McFayden (1945), 45 S.R. 200 (N.S.W.). This is a
strong statement as the student alleged personal vindictiveness on the part of the
examiner, not simply challenging the academic assessment. This might not now be
the attitude of the courts today in these circumstances.
11. [1966] 2 Q.B. 237 at p. 243 -C.A.). The cases of Sammy v. Birbeck College
Times Law Report 3rd November 1964 -H.C.) D'Mello v. Loughborough College of
Technology Times Law Report 17th June 1970 (.H.C.) were concerned with
breaches of contract arising from alleged failures to teach adequately not to mark
properly.
12. (1975) 59 D.L.R. (3rd) 197 (Ont. H.C.D.C.), at p. 206.
13. Ibid..
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before the appeal. Weatherston J. stressed that the appeal process
was not intended to constitute a new examination or assessment,
rather it was an inquiry to ensure that the examination had been
properly conducted. A grade appeal system is really 'procedural
review' of the initial decision not an appeal on the merits. Conse-
quently the student was not entitled to reopen the question of the
accuracy of the assessment. In performing the task of ensuring the
examination was properly conducted, Weatherston J. stated firmly
that neither an adversarial procedure nor an oral hearing was
required; the appeal board could deal with the matter by written
submissions from the student setting out his complaint. Presumably
the faculty member would set out the procedure for evaluation and
the student would outline his reasons for believing that this method
was not properly applied. There are however circumstances where
questions of fact are in issue - such as whether a faculty member did
explain the method of evaluation to the students. However, the
nature of a grade appeal, the antagonism that oral hearings and
cross-examination might generate together with the administrative
burdens that these types of procedure would impose suggest that they
are not appropriate in the context of grade appeals.
It is useful to give further consideration to what material can fairly
be said to form part of an academic assessment as a student will not
be entitled to challenge the accuracy of this material before an appeal
board or a court. The setting of academic standards and the marking
of examination scripts and research papers obviously fall into this
description. One case, Herring v. Templeman,' 4 suggests a wider
definition of 'purely academic'. There a board had to assess a stu-
dent's teacher training practice at a school. In doing so they consi-
dered reports from the school headmaster, external assessors and
members of the college staff. The court held that all this was relevant
material in an academic assessment of the student. As such, the
gathering of the material was not subject to judicially imposed pro-
cedural requirements. Therefore a student had no common law pro-
cedural right to call witnesses and engage in cross-examination on
this material. It seems that anything that involves an assessment of
academic ability might escape the rigours of judicial control. It
might, of course, be a different matter if any genuine doubts about
the good faith of those making the assessment were involved. It is,
14. [1973] 3 All E.R. 569 (C.A.).
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though, unlikely that a court would question the university's good
faith except in exceptional circumstances.
A Canadian case, Re Mclnnes and Simon Fraser University5 sug-
gests another ground on which the courts might intervene in this type
of academic evaluation. The court held that an appeal body whose
duty it was to ensure that the assessment was properly and fairly
conducted, must have "some evidence logically capable of support-
ing the conclusion to which the [university appeal board] has
come".' 6 The court emphasised that it would not evaluate or weigh
the evidence so long as there was some evidence of probative value
on which the appeal body could base its decision. It seems that the
test of "evidence of probative value" is quite low in this context. In
the Mclnnes case, the appeal board relied on evidence from a faculty
member not involved with or responsible for the assessment and
reports on the student some of which were drawn up after the assess-
ment was made. It should not be difficult, therefore, to produce
probative evidence. It may though be wise to document the student's
progress and maintain records.
The second category of academic decisions all involve to some
extent objective questions of fact. Even a decision to expel a student
for low academic achievement might involve a university in consider-
ing matters other than his academic record, such as his attendance
record or his family or personal history. Some decisions mainly
involve questions of fact and judgment such as whether a student's
disability merits special treatment at an examination. As these types
of cases involve more than academic assessments, courts are prepared
to review the procedures by which such decisions are reached.
A number of factors seem relevant in deciding what type of proce-
dures should be required. Again, the effect of the decision on the
student's academic career, and perhaps his employment prospects,
must be weighed against the desire not to over-burden the university
staff with time-consuming procedures which detract them from their
teaching and research. One factor that might be decisive is the nature
of the decision. Some decisions simply involve the student presenting
facts to justify the application of or departure from a university rule
or policy. Others involve no dispute over facts or questions of witness
15. (1982), 140 D.L.R. (3d) 694 (B.C.S.C.T.D.). Affirmed by the B.C. Court of
Appeal (1984) 3 D.L.R (4th ed.) 709. The case confirmed that cross-examination on
the subject-matter of the reports was not appropriate.
16. Ikid., per McLachlin J. at 608.
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credibility. In such cases universities might be permitted to operate by
written submissions if it wishes as the interests of the student can be
protected without requiring an oral hearing or cross-examination.
Decisions involving questions of fact or witness credibility are
more difficult as these issues are more suited to oral hearings and
cross-examinations. However, a full hearing, (perhaps with legal
assistance?) would impose heavy burdens on university staff in terms
of time. In addition adversarial proceedings might generate antago-
nism in a small academic community, especially where a person
might feel his academic integrity was being questioned or where the
protagonists will be expected to continue a teacher-student relation-
ship after the hearing. These factors might suggest that a university
be allowed to proceed without allowing cross-examination (or legal
assistance which will add to the cost and reinforce the adversarial
nature of a hearing). Perhaps an oral hearing with the opportunity to
reply and comment on evidence would be an acceptable compromise.
Perhaps the whole matter could be dealt with by written submissions
giving each side the opportunity of commenting on the other
submissions.
The courts do seem to have grasped the distinction between purely
academic decisions involving subjective evaluation of academic merit
(where they do not intervene) and those decisions which relate to a
student's academic career but which involve other, non-academic
material. The most familiar example is probably R v. Aston Universi-
ty Senate ex p. Roffey. 7 There the examiners in deciding to expel a
student considered not only his examination results but also his per-
sonal, family and medical records. The court concluded that:
In such circumstances and with so much at stake, common faire-
ness to the students, which is all that natural justice is, and the
desire of the examiners to exercise their discretion upon the most
solid basis, alike demanded that before a final decision was
reached the students should be given an opportunity to be heard
either orally or in writing, in person or by their representatives as
might be most appropriate. I8
17. [1969] 2Q.B. 538 (D.C.).
18. Ibid. per Donaldson J. at p. 554. For a relatively well-known Canadian example
of judicial review of academic decisions, see Re Polten, supra note 12; court could
ensure that an examination was fairly and properly conducted although it could not
look at the merits of the examination or the standards set by the examining
committee.
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If the examiners had done so, they would have been made aware of
allegations that the students had been misled as to the significance of
the examinations and so failed to prepare for them. Other bodies in
the universities had felt that this justified giving the students a second
chance.
Such statements while reaffirming the possibility of judicial inter-
vention in the area of academic decisions do little to analyse the
underlying issues involved or to suggest which blend of factors justi-
fies the imposition of which procedure. Subsequent case law provides
some, if limited guidance on this issue.
In Herring v. Templeman"9 the applicant sought to contest a deci-
sion to expel him because of his poor academic performance. The
rules of the institution did provide for an oral hearing before the
governing body. The question was what this included. The court
analysed the hearing as one designed to give the student the oppor-
tunity to demonstrate why, in spite of his poor results, he should not
be expelled. In effect they classed it - quite properly -as a case
where a student brings forward material to avoid the application of a
rule. As such it was not a retrial of the academic assessment. Nor was
it to be a full legal trial with examination and cross-examination. In
short, all that was needed was opportunity to make submissions.
A similar result was reached in Brighton Corporation v. Parry.2"
Again a student who failed to meet the necessary academic require-
ments argued he should not be expelled, this time basing his claim on
the fact that in view of his duties as the student union president he
should not be subject to any degree requirements. Willis J. felt that
offering the student the opportunity to make written submissions was
a fair method of proceeding since that ensured the Board of Gover-
nors was fully appraised of the student's argument. Neither of these
cases involve the more problematic situation where disputed facts or
witness credibility was in issue. It is difficult to predict whether in
such a case the courts would still have thought that the simple oppor-
tunity to make oral or written submissions was satisfactory.
Similar sentiments have been expressed in Canada. In King v.
University of Saskatchewan,2" King failed to obtain the necessary
standing for the award of a law degree but argued he should be
19. Supra, note 14.
20. (1972), 70 L.G.R. 576 (Div. Ct.).
21. [1969] S.C.R. 678.
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granted one due to special circumstances and for compassionate rea-
sons. Two committees rejected King's appeal without hearing him in
person. The Senate, acting through committee, did hear King in
person with legal representation. Spence J. declined to consider
whether the earlier procedures were fair as any breach that might
have occurred were cured by the Senate appeal. 22 Spence J. did have
this to say:
The considerations which are given to such an issue are not those
which can be assisted by an adversary formula, and it is difficult to
conceive of a situation which would have the representatives of a
law school faculty confronting the representatives of a student in
the trial of an issue as to whether a degree should be granted.
23
It is not clear whether Spence J.'s belief that adversarial proce-
dures are inappropriate is limited solely to cases where a student seeks
to have a particular decision waived by bringing forth additional
material. He may be suggesting that the antagonism that might be
generated outweigh the advantages of cross-examination in an aca-
demic situation even where disputed facts are in issue.
The cases discussed, while they shed some light on what academic
decisions might require in the way of procedure, lack clarity and
thoroughness of analysis. In particular they seem to fail to appreciate
that academic decisions involve different considerations and seem to
treat them as one category. To a large extent this might be explicable
on the grounds that the cases tended to throw up one type of situa-
tion that where a student sought to bring material forward to avoid
the application of faculty rule. Even so, it would have been helpful if
the courts had made the grounds for their particular decisions more
explicit.
III. Disciplinary Decisions
Discipline may be necessary to ensure a climate in which a university
can pursue its academic aims of teaching and research but it is largely
ancillary to those aims. Few today would agree with the robust
comments of Lord Kenyon C.J. in 1794 in confirming the power of
the vice-chancellor's court at Cambridge to prohibit the publication
of religious pamphlets. "Discipline", he said of a university, "is the
22. On the question of appeals 'curing' a breach of natural justice or fairness at an
earlier stage in the proceedings see infra pages 340, 341.
23. In King's case, supra, note 21, at p. 686.
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soul of such body ' 2 4 and universities must have the power "of con-
trolling and checking those evils which, without correction, would be
subversive of all displine in the university".
There is nothing inherently different about disciplinary matters
within a university from those within any other body. The university
has no obvious claim to special expertise as it has, for example, in the
area of academic evaluation. Consequently, there is no justification
for undue judicial deference to university authorities in this area.
Naturally, though, a court should have regard to the ramifications
upon a university administrative structure of the procedures that it
insists be observed. The courts seem aware of the difference between
academic decisions and discipline decisions in this respect -although
this awareness does not always seem to be translated into a readiness
to intervene where necessary.
Among the factors relevant in deciding an appropriate procedure
in disciplinary decisions is the severity of the sanction involved. The
graver the consequences, the stronger must be the presumption in
favour of more stringent procedural requirements to safeguard the
individual and with correspondingly less importance attached to
administrative convenience. Within a university, sanctions may
range from expulsion and suspension down to library or parking
fines. Obviously a different approach is required when expulsion is in
issue rather than fines for overdue books. Where minor sanctions are
concerned, the administrative inconvenience that would be caused
by insisting on particular procedures probably negates the need for
judicially-imposed procedures. Minor disputes could fairly be viewed
as part of the routine of administration, best settled informally, with-
out the use of disciplinary machinery or judicial supervision.
Assuming the matter is a more serious one, attracting expulsion or
suspension or heavy fines, a similar latitude to university administra-
tive inconvenience may not be forthcoming. Such matters belong
firmly in the disciplinary process and the court is well suited to
supervise the procedures used. All of that is not to say that the courts
should not take into account the restraints to which the university
administration is subject. The nature of the dispute is again highly
relevant; where facts are disputed and the credibility of witnesses
challenged more adjudicative procedures such as cross-examination
24. In R. v. Chancellor of Cambridge University (1774), 6T.R. 89 at 106; 101 E.R.
451 at p. 460.
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may be needed. These considerations need to be weighed against the
strain and hostility that such procedures may cause in a small, closed
community. However, the likelihood of this occuring should be rea-
listically evaluated. Where a person is threatened with expulsion it
would seem that such reasons be not used to deny him the fullest
opportunity for defending himself. Where the facts are largely
agreed, however, and a student is simply making a plea of mitigation
the need for harmony may suggest cross-examination is not so vital.
None of this should operate as a bar to informal attempts to resolve
matters but adequate machinery should exist where needed or
requested.
Judicial willingness to involve themselves in university discipline
dates back as far as 1723 with the famous case of Dr. Bentley.
25
There the university removed Dr. Bentley's degrees because of his
alleged contempt of the Vice-Chancellor's court. The court upheld a
complaint that Dr. Bentley had been given no notice of the proceed-
ings and not been given a chance to appear and defend himself.
Mandamus issued to restore Dr. Bentley to his degrees, with the court
stressing the fundamental importance of a hearing in such cases. One
judge, Fortescue J., picturesquely saw divine parallels in the matter,
commenting:
I remember to have heard it observed by a very learned man upon
such an occasion, that even God himself did not pass sentence
upon Adam, before he was called upon to make his defence.
Adam (says God), where art thou? Hast thou not eaten of the tree,
whereof I commanded thee that thou shouldst not eat? And the
same question was put to Eve also.
2 6
Modern cases have reaffirmed that need to observe procedural
fairness in disciplinary hearings but have provided little analysis of
the exact types of procedures that are appropriate. In Glynn v. Keele
University27 a student was accused of nude sunbathing on campus.
The Vice-Chancellor in whom disciplinary authority vested, fined
him £70 and expelled him from the university residences. The student
was informed of the penalty by letter and told of his right to appeal
but no opportunity for a hearing of any kind was given before the
initial decisions was taken. In his judgment, Pennycuick V.C. distin-
guished between those instances where there was a need to impose
25. R. v. University of Cambridge (1723), 1 Str. 557; 93 E.R. 698.
26. Ibid.,at p. 567, 704.
27. [1971] 1 W.L.R. 487 (Ch.).
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penalties to enforce discipline but where there was only a moral
obligation to be fair and those instance where (in the language of
judicial review of the time) the university was acting "quasi-judicial-
ly" and so subject to judicial supervision. This seems no more than
the distinction between minor and major offences suggested above.
Exclusion, affecting the position of the student in the university,
naturally fell within the more serious category and such decisions had
to comply with the requirements of procedural fairness.
Having made this initial distinction, Pennycuick V.C. had to con-
sider the procedures that the university should have adopted. Unfor-
tunately, his judgment is unclear on this issue. Pennycuick V.C.
suggested that the Vice-Chancellor should have sent for Glynn
before he left the university for the summer and given him the oppor-
tunity to present his case. This suggests that an oral hearing will
normally be appropriate. There was no mention of the bringing of
witnesses or cross-examination. This could mean that, as no hearing
of any kind had been given so procedural fairness was clearly not
observed, there was no need to spell out detailed procedural require-
ments. Or Pennycuick V.C. might have considered that cross-exami-
nation was not required as a rule for these decisions. Or, as the case
proceeded on the assumption that there was no dispute as to whether
Glynn was involved and no question of disputed facts or identifica-
tion, all that might have been necessary was to give Glynn the
opportunity to claim mitigating circumstances or argue that nude-
sunbathing was an acceptable pastime. In such circumstances, cross-
examination might not be necessary. The basis of Pennycuick V.C.'s
judgement is not clear.
In addition, assuming that the case was simply one of a plea of
mitigation, one would have thought Pennycuick V.C. would have
considered the adequacy of written submissions in the circumstances.
Assuming Glynn had already left Keele for the summer, the added
inconvenience of arranging an oral hearing might have justified a
written hearing. The same would by no means be true of a disputed
offence where it may be necessary to wait until the university recon-
venes and all witnesses are available before a hearing goes ahead.
Unfortunately, the court failed to rise to the occasion and failed to
deal with the issues. More unfortunate still is the failure of the court
to explain why the issues were not being dealt with - which leaves
the ultimate result shrouded in uncertainty.
Another opportunity for judicial clarification was missed in ex p.
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Bolchover. 28 A post-graduate student was expelled after certain dis-
turbances during which he allegedly assaulted a marshall. Among the
facts complained of were: failure to inform him of which incidents he
was charged with; absence of legal assistance; refusal to allow a
short-hand writer to be present so the student had to take his own
notes and could not give proper instructions to his advisor; cross-ex-
amination was restricted. At least some of these merited considera-
tion but in a briefly reported judgment we are told only that the court
found the hearing was not unfair although another tribunal "would
have been ideal". It is impossible to deduce whether the allegations
were not substantiated or whether the procedural rights claimed were
inapplicable. No indication is given of what rights the student was
given except that one can deduce from counsel's agrument that he
had an oral hearing and was allowed the assistance of a friend.
Canadian authorities are perhaps a little more helpful but again
they fail to give a detailed analysis of the issues involved. In Walls v.
Commissioners of Saint John General Hospital,29 a nurse was dis-
missed for alleged incompetence and irresponsibility. She was inter-
viewed - but not informed that she might be dismissed. At a later
committee hearing she was not fully informed of the allegations.
Stevenson J. concluded that she had been denied a fair hearing.
While this reconfirms the need for notice and to be told the substance
of the allegations, it fails to particularise the procedures to be used at
a hearing. It may be that, having found a breach of natural justice,
Stevenson J. felt it was unnecessary to go further. Perhaps the com-
mon law tradition of restricting a decision to the facts of the instant
case stands in the way of developing a generalised code of fair
procedure.
The need for a certain degree of flexibility in the procedures used
was emphasised in Re Schabas and the Caput of the University of
Toronto.30 Disciplinary hearings before the Caput, the university
disciplinary tribunal, were regulated by statute31 and the value of this
case in gauging common law natural justice requirements is limited.
Nevertheless, it does seem implicit in the judgments that an oral
hearing and cross-examination may be necessary. More important,
28. The Times, October 7th, 1970.
29. (1973), 9 N.B.R. (2nd) 106 (N.B.S.C.Q.B.).
30. (1974), 52 D.L.R. (3rd) 495 (Ont. H.C. Div. Ct.).
31. Statutory Powers Procedure Act, 1971, S.O. 1971, c. 47.
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Pennell J. emphasised that a tribunal has a discretion to exclude
irrelevant or redundant cross-examination. If a tribunal is to function
effectively it must surely be able to exercise a degree of control over
the proceedings - but a court, too, should ensure that discretion is
used properly. If it is used to exclude relevant as opposed to repeti-
tious or irrelevant evidence a court should treat that as a denial of a
fair hearing. This was done in a recent prison discipline case,3 2 and
what is appropriate for prisoners should at least be available for
students.
The case-law on university discipline does little to shed light on
what procedures should be used, or even what factors are relevant in
deciding this. There seems a reluctance to interfere in university
matters which is reflected in the marked lack of clarity and precision
in the judgments. While basic distinctions have been drawn, notably
between serious and minor offences, little else has been clarified.
IV. Academic Offences
Universities naturally seek to protect their academic integrity and
reputation by outlawing activities such as plagiarism, cheating and
obtaining qualifications and admission by deception. Sanctions
imposed may range from denial of credit in a particular course to
expulsion. Academic discipline can be viewed as part of the general
disciplinary powers of a university. It involves findings of fact and the
imposition of sanctions. At the same time, such offences are bound
up with the essentially academic nature of a university. In deciding
whether an offence has occurred expertise in the subject-matter or
familiarity with a student's academic capabilities may be useful. Con-
sequently it seems wise to deal with academic discipline separately.
This division is borne out by the practice of universities which fre-
quently establish a separate committee to deal with academic
offences.
There is not a great deal of case-law involving such matters and no
express recognition in the judgments that academic discipline is a
separate category of decisions. The issue did arise in Ceylon Universi-
ty v. Fernando3" where a student was accused by another student of
having prior knowledge of examination questions. Fernando and the
student making the allegations were interviewed separately. Feman-
32. R. v. Hull Prison Board of Visitors exp. St. Germain (No. 2), [1979] 3 All E.R.
545 (C.A.).
33. [1960] 1 W.L.R. 223. (.P.C.).
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do argued that he should have been present at the questioning and
allowed to cross-examine the student. The Privy Council held that a
fair opportunity to contradict the evidence was required but that a
failure to inform Fernando that he might cross-examine the student
was not a breach of natural justice. But the Privy Council suggested
that if Fernando had requested cross-examination and been refused
then there might be a stronger case that Fernando had been treated
unfairly. De Smith has strongly criticised this aspect of the judg-
ment.3 4 As he says, either cross-examination was required by natural
justice in this context, in which case the student should be informed
of his rights. Or cross-examination was not a requirement in which
case the fact that the defendant had requested it would make no
difference.
There certainly seem strong arguments for allowing cross-examina-
tion, at least where disputed facts or witness credibility is in issue. The
consequences of a finding that an academic offence has been com-
mitted are usually grave - Fernando was denied a first class honours
degree. In addition, there is the moral obloquy attached to findings of
cheating or plagiarism. The Privy Council recognised that the student
making allegations in the Fernando case "was the one essential wit-
ness against [Fernando], and the charge in the end resolved itself into
a matter of her words against his". 35 Surely these are the very cir-
cumstances when cross-examination is most useful, where there is a
limited question involving witness credibility and disputed facts.
It is difficult to regard the Fernando case as particularly persuasive.
The judgment concentrates on whether a failure to grant cross-exam-
ination rights where they are requested is a breach of natural justice
rather than assessing whether cross-examination is a right. The case
was decided in 1960 before the "revival" of judicial supervision of
administrative action. 6 It reflects a readiness on the part of the
courts to allow administrative bodies to function as they wish, with
the courts exercising only a residual control in cases where an admi-
nistrative body gives no kind of opportunity for the individual to
state his case. Nowadays the courts should be more directly involved
34. (1960), 23 M.L.R. 428.
35. Supra, note 33, at p. 235.
36. Although it is interesting to note that De Smith believed the balance to be tilted
marginally against allowing cross-examination supra note 34 at page 431. Even
changes in attitude may not necessarily mean a different result would be reached
today.
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in structuring the exercise of power and in particularising the proced-
ural requirements necessary in any given context.
None of the cases discussed in the area of university discipline gives
much assistance in predicting what procedural requirements a univer-
sity must observe. Certainly where the sanction is a severe one, the
student must be informed of the substance of the allegations and
given the opportunity to respond. This, it seems, will normally
require an oral hearing. However the courts have not considered the
necessity of allowing witness, cross-examination or perhaps, even
legal assistance.
This judicial reluctance to spell out the requirements of procedural
fairness may result from the fact that these cases were decided at an
early period in the revival of judicial review. More recent and analo-
gous cases suggest a more robust attitude on the parts of the courts.
Kane v. Governors of the University of British Columbia3 7 concerned
disciplinary action against a professor. Dickson J. stressed that "a
high standard of justice is required when the right to continue in
one's profession is at stake". 3 8 Consequently, the Board deciding the
case should not have held private interviews with witnesses nor heard
any evidence in the absence of one of the parties. In a British prison
case,39 Geoffrey Lane L.J. said that in disciplinary offences involving
potentially serious consequences, the right to be heard will include
the right to bring witnesses where the proceeding is designed to
establish innocence or guilt. Cross-examination may also be neces-
sary depending on the nature of the evidence. He cited the example
of evidence relating to identification as being suitable for cross-exam-
ination. Any issue involving disputed fact or witness credibility will
also probably fall into this category. The chairman does have an
overall discretion to disallow witnesses or cross-examination but must
exercise this discretion "reasonably in good faith and on proper
grounds". These statements are surely no les applicable to university
discipline than they are to prison discipline.
V. The Rule Against Bias
The twin pillar of the right to a fair hearing is the right to an unbiased
and impartial decision. A decision will be invalidated if the surround-
ing circumstances create a reasonable apprehension that there is a
37. [1980] 1 S.C.R. 1105.
38. In Kane's case, supra, note 37 at p. 1113.
39. R. v. Huil Prison Visitors Board ex p. St. Germain, supra, note 32.
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likelihood of bias." Particular problems arise in applying this princi-
ple to universities because of their institutional structure. Universities
are quintessentially "government by committee". The practice is for
a wide range of functions to be vested in a Senate or Board of
Governors. They delegate a number of decisions to the individual
faculties which in turn frequently establish committees either to make
recommendations to faculty or to make decisions and report these to
faculty. Cross-membership of university bodies is common in univer-
sities. The same person may teach a student, sit on a committee to
hear a student's complaint, attend a faculty meeting to consider the
committee's findings and be eligible to attend Senate meetings where
the matter may ultimately be decided. The extent to which such
cross-membership contravenes the rule against bias obviously has
great significance for the structure of university administration.
In considering the problem of bias in a university the distinction
between the types of decisions made should be borne in mind. There
might be different results depending on whether the cross-member-
ship occurs in considering an academic grievance, a disciplinary mat-
ter or an alleged academic offence. What may constitute bias in one
setting may be excusable in another.
A more fundamental distinction may rest on the functions per-
formed by the various committees. A committee may be a fact-find-
ing body which gathers information and presents a concise report to
a larger body (such as Faculty Council or Senate) which may be too
large and unwieldly to perform this task itself. The parent body may
make the actual decision. If members of the committee participate in
the parent body's deliberations does this create a presumption that
the parent body was biased in favour of the committee's report and
so failed to give it genuinely impartial consideration? A great deal
may depend on whether the initial committee reports facts, makes
recommendations or is the effective decision-maker with approval of
the report being a formality.
Alternatively, the committee structure may be appellate in nature.
The committee may have jurisdiction to make a decision. This might
be appealed to Faculty Council and thereafter to the Senate. Can a
person who takes a decision also hear an appeal against his decision
- and would this operate to stop all faculty members from attending
a Senate appeal against a decision of Faculty Council?
40. The test is discussed extensively in Metropolitan Properties v. Lannon, [ 1969] 1
Q.B. 577 (C.A.).
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There is surprisingly little consideration of this problem in the
United Kingdom. It seems to have been accepted without discussion
in Osgood v. Nelson" that members of a committee which investigat-
ed a complaint, gathered evidence and made a report could sit on the
parent body which took the decision. The matter was not raised
directly.
Canadian cases have dealt more fully with the question of bias
both generally within committee structures and specifically within a
university context. The leading case is probably Law Society of Upper
Canada v. French42 where a lawyer was charged with disciplinary
offences. The matter was investigated by a disciplinary committee
which found him guilty and recommended to Convocation, the par-
ent body, that he be expelled. Two members of the committee partic-
ipated in the deliberations of Convocation. Two views on the proprie-
ty of this emerged from the judgments.
Spence J. for the majority drew a distinction between situations
where there is an appeal from one body to another where member-
ship of both bodies would create a presumption of bias. Where there
was a two-stage process with firstly an investigation and report by
one body and consideration and disposition of that report by another
body, membership of both would be permissible.
The minority judgment, which is in many ways more convincing,
felt the issue could not simply be resolved by characterising the
process as appellate or as a two-stage inquiry. They felt the real
distinction was whether the body not only found facts but also drew
conclusions as to guilt and made recommendations as to penalties. In
such circumstances to allow cross-membership would mean that
some members of the parent body would have preconceived ideas on
the matter and so it would not seem to be giving a completely
impartial consideration of the issues. This is the principle which seems
most clearly to accord with the underlying rationale of the rule
against bias - that no one who has been involved in making find-
ings of guilt should participate in the final decision. The desire to
ensure that justice be done surely overrides arguments that logically
where there is an inquiry and a later decision this is all part of one
process. The two stages of the process are physically separate and it
may be preferable to preserve this separation in the area of committee
41. [1872] L.R. 5H.L. 636.
42. [1975] 2 S.C.R. 767.
333 The Dalhousie Law Journal
membership by refusing to allow duplication.
Whatever the correctness of this basic distinction, it is not clear
that it can simply be transplanted into the university context. An
earlier case, King v. University of Saskatchewan,43 had already con-
sidered the problem in the university context. This involved the refus-
al of a degree for failure to meet the requirements, an academic
mater, not a disciplinary one. Three separate committees considered
the issue before it reached the Senate Appeal Committee with dupli-
cation of membership arising at each stage including the final one.
Technically, the Senate alone had jurisdiction to award degrees and it
would have been possible to regard the previous committee "deci-
sions" as recommendations. However Spence J. throughout dealt
with the matter as if the process were appellate in nature and that the
Senate was an appeal body. He seemed to suggest that, given the
nature of a university as one community and the structure of universi-
ty government, duplication of membership was inevitable. Conse-
quently, he refused to treat that as raising a presumption of bias. If
cross-membership is permissible in appellate procedures, it would,
one presumes, apply a fortiori to bodies which make recommenda-
tions. Spence J. does not say whether the judgment applies only to
academic matters - where, perhaps, duplication might be expected
to occur more frequently - or to disciplinary decisions also.
In French's case, Spence J. referred to his judgment in King which
he said must "be understood as applying only to its particular circum-
stances". 4 4 Unfortunately he failed to make it clear which particular
circumstances he meant. There are three possibilities. Firstly, did
Spence J. mean the rule against duplication of membership in appel-
late proceedings did not apply to university bodies generally. If so
duplication could never invalidate decisions whether academic or
disciplinary whether proceedings are appellate or recommendatory.
Secondly, did he mean the rule did not apply to academic decisions
only, so academic appeal procedures could not be vitiated by cross-
membership (recommendatory proceedings for both academic and
disciplinary decisions would not be invalidated by cross-membership
by analogy with Spence J.'s reasoning in French). Finally, is King
limited to the fact that the Senate had original jurisdiction and the
other bodies could be regarded as recommendatory - so duplication
did not raise the presumption of bias - but if the procedings had
43. Supra, note 21.
44. Supra, note 42 at p. 783.
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been appellate in nature the decision might have been invalidated?
This would bring universities into line with the position in other
bodies, where recommendation proceedings in academic and disci-
pline matters would not be invalidated by cross-membership but
appellate procedure would be invalidated.
Given that the ambiguity in the judgment leaves room for maneu-
vre, its interpretation is largely a matter for personal choice based on
one's view of duplication of membership. There seem to be no con-
vincing reasons why appeal decisions in disciplinary cases should not
be vitiated where cross-membership occurs. There is nothing inher-
ently different about a disciplinary decision in a univrsity as com-
pared with other institutions. Therefore, it would seem that the gen-
eral presumption against allowing cross-membership in disciplinary
appellate procedures should apply. Such cases are relatively rare: it
should not be difficult to set up a small committee to deal with such
affairs. There seems no real threat to the smooth running of universi-
ty affairs if the members were subsequently excluded from appeals
against their decision. They are not being disbarred form participat-
ing in the mainstream of university government as discipline is surely
a peripheral concern.
Academic appeals may perhaps cause more difficulty. They are
different in nature from other decisions. They normally do not
involve findings of fact or fix guilt; rather they tend to involve
considering applying, or granting an exemption from, a rule. Even
so, if a person participates in that decision he is surely likely to take
his prejudices in favour of the decision to the appeal body. There is
nothing in the nature of the decision which dispels the underlying
rationale of the rule, that a person should not sit in judgment on his
own decisions as he is likely to appear prejudiced in favour of the
earlier decision. It may be that the volume of decisions and inability
to find members of staff to serve on each committee makes duplica-
tion inevitable. But again a small committee could be set up to
consider initial decisions and its members precluded from participat-
ing in the appeal body's deliberations. It is difficult to see how fears
of administrative inconvenience pose any real problem. In principle it
seems that any rule preventing duplication of membership in the
appellate process should apply to academic decisions.
A problem might arise where a student appeals the decision of his
department or faculty outside that unit to a university body. Obvious-
ly the supervisor, examiner or re-reader should not be entitled to sit
on the university body as they are connected with the particular
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student and decision in question. Some remarks of Spence J. in King
v. University of Saskatchewan45 suggest the rule against bias
demands more than that. In concluding that no bias existed where
there was duplication of membership, Spence J. thought it "signifi-
cant" that no member of the faculty involved was a member of the
committees that considered the appeal. Does this mean that when a
Senate or one of its committees hears an appeal no member of the
relevant academic unit, the faculty or perhaps in large faculties such
as Arts and Sciences, the department, should sit on the appeal board?
It is arguable that a student might feel that the presence of a member
of the very group he is challenging necessarily indicates a bias in
favour of the existing decision. Perhaps fairness might more easily be
seen to be done if there was a strict separation of faculty and universi-
ty at the university level. Conversely, it is arguable that the presence
of a faculty member would be useful as he could explain the proce-
dures or policies of the faculty but this could easily be obtained for
example by asking the Dean to provide a written memorandum on
faculty procedures or policy.
VI. The Rule Against Delegation
The institutional structure of universities with its tendency to vest
powers intially in a Senate or Board of Governors and thereafter to
delegate these powers to the faculty who in turn delegate them to a
committee causes problems in other areas of administrative law.
There is a presumption in administrative law that where a statute
vests discretionary power in a particular body that body itself must
exercise the power.4 6 Delegation to another body unless authorised
by statute is prima facie unlawful and any purported exercise of the
delegated authority is invalid. This is, though, only a rule of construc-
tion and it only creates a presumption against allowing delegation.
Where the reasons underlying this insistence on non-delegation are
absent, or where the nature of the statutory scheme suggests that
delegation is permissible, the presumption may be rebutted. The prob-
lem lies firstly in deciding which categories of decisions must the
statutorily designated body retain for itself, and second where it does
retain a particular decision-making power which, if any, aspects of
the decision-making process may still be delegated.
45. Supra, note 21.
46. See generally De Smith Judicial Review of Administrative Action (4th edition)
pages 298-309. Wade Administrative Law (5th edition) pages 319-329 and see
Willis: Delegatus non Potest Delegare (1943), 21 Can. Bar Rev. 257.
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The statute itself may well authorise delegation.47 Whether it has
done so and on what conditions is itself a matter of construing the
particular statute. In the absence of express authority it is necessary
to look at the nature of the function involved and the general scheme
of the statute to see if delegation is permissible. It is often asserted
that "judicial" functions are not normally delegable. As "judicial"
has proved to be a confusing term, it is probably best to look at the
types of decisions to which this epithet was applied and the reasons
for holding the particular function to be non-delegable.
Disciplinary functions have normally been regarded as exercisable
only by the person designated. The classic case is Vine v. National
Dock Labour Board48 where a local board delegated its disciplinary
functions to a disciplinary committee. The House of Lords held that
the board itself had to decide, emphasising the seriousness of the
decision - a man could be dismissed from his employment. They
also stressed that the board was carefully balanced in membership
between employers and employees which reinforced the presumption
that the statute contemplated the board itself deciding these disputes.
It is possible to argue that disciplinary procedures within a univer-
sity are equally important and should not be delegated to committees
unless authorised. Such a view, though, would be unrealistic in many
circumstances. There is nothing to indicate that Senate is specifically
suited because of membership or attributes to perform disciplinary
functions. Indeed the Senate will often be a large, somewhat
unwieldly body not particularly suited to perform fact-finding exer-
cises. (This, of course, could be used to justify only allowing Senate to
delegate the fact-finding part of the decision-making process; it does
not necessarily justify delegating the decision-making power). It is
perhaps more realistic to view the founding statute as creating a
self-regulating community, endowing the Senate with legislative
powers which it can allocate to such bodies as it thinks appropriate.
This would be preferable to treating the statute as setting out a
47. See for example Dalhousie UniversityAct, S.N.S. 1969, c. 127, s. 1 amendings
s. 7 of S.N.S. 1863, c. 24 to allow for delegation of disciplinary functions within
Dalhousie University; Mount Saint Vincent Act, S.N.S. 1966, c. 124, s. 17(3),
power for Senate to delegate any of its powers.
48. [1957] A.C. 488 (H.L.). See also Barnard v. National Dock Labour Board,
[1953] 2 Q.B. 18 (C.A.) delegation of local committee's disciplinary functions to
port manager unlawful. R. v. College of Physicians and Surgeons of British
Columbia ex p. Ahirad (1970), 18 D.L.R. (3rd) 197 (B.C.C.A.), unlawful to
delegate power to determine if physician had adequate skill.
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limited scheme with powers carefully allocated between the particu-
lar components.
In matters of academic decisions, it would be impracticable to
interepret the general regulating power given to Senate as a direction
that it personally take all decisions. Decisions as to whether a student
passes or fails; if there are special circumstances justifying special
examinations or aegrotat degree standing must largely be left to
departments or faculties. The Senate would still be able to control
general academic policy, but the sheer volume of decisions make the
concept of individualised consideration by the Senate unworkable.
Little attention has been paid in the British and Canadian case-
law to the problems that a strict application of the principle might
create for universities. Specific recognition of the problem is seen in
an Australian case, Re University of Sydney ex p. Forster. 4 9 The case
involved an academic matter, the power to consider students' appli-
cations not to be dismissed from the university in the light of their
academic performance which had been delegated to a committee.
The court said that:
The object of the statute is the entire management of and superin-
tendence over the affairs of a university, an object which necessari-
ly involves the making of, amongst others, myriad decisions affect-
ing individual students, frequently in exigencies occuring between
meetings of the Senate .... Without the most ample facility for
delegation the affairs of a university could not be carried on at
all.s°
This realism might be borne in mind when considering the legality of
delegation.
There may be occasions when the statute specifically indicates that
a specific body take a decision or provides for an appeal to Senate. In
such circumstances, the question is raised of the extent to which the
body in question can delegate certain aspects of its decision-making
function. Jeffs v. New Zealand Dairy Production and Marketing
Board51 considered this in the context of the Dairy Board's zoning
powers. A committee was established to investigate the problems, but
only made recommendations and did not provide a summary of the
evidence taken nor the written submissions. This was not sufficient as
the Board was not fully informed of the evidence and so was not in a
49. [1963] S.R. 723 (N.S.W.).
50. Ibid., at page 733.
51. [1967] A.C. 551 (P.C.).
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position to make a considered decision. It remains to be seen whether
the same stringency will be demanded of a university senate seeking
to gather facts by means of an investigate committee.
There seems no reason why a university senate, the effective "legis-
lature", should not be free to delegate many of its functions. One
cautionary note should, perhaps, be added. When a committee
becomes the effective fact-finding or deciding body, the procedures
the committee should be required to follow are the procedures that
the Senate itself might have had to observe. There is a danger that
first the courts will allow a Senate to delegate fact-finding tasks and
then conclude that as the committee merely "recommends" 52 and
does not "decide", the strict rules of procedure can be relaxed at the
committee hearing. This might deprive a student of the appropriate
hearing and would be unfair. Realism about the structure of universi-
ty decision-making should extend beyond the applications of princi-
ples of non-delegation. The courts should locate the effective decisi-
on-making centres rather than the formal ones and subject those to
judicial scrutiny.
VII. Potential Bars to Judicial Review of University Affairs
(i) The Visitor.
The Visitor is a university functionary who, theoretically, stands at
the apex of the university hierarchy. His importance lies in his sole
and exclusive jurisdiction over "whatever relates to the internal
arrangements and dealings... of the institution". 53 The history and
case law surrounding the visitor has been thoroughly researched
elsewhere.54 Some of the legislation establishing particular Canadian
universities have, perhaps unwittingly, endowed them with a univer-
sity Visitor, often possessing full visitorial powers.55
Given the exclusive nature of the Visitor's jurisdiction, it becomes
important to determine the extent of that jurisdiction and to assess
52. See for example Herring v. Templemen, supra, note 14 where the court seemed
to fall into this mistake. One of the reasons for relaxing the procedural requirements
was said to be that the committee in question merely "recommended" a course of
action to the governing body. In fact the committee made a conclusive decision on
the academic merits of a complaint which would not be re-examined by the
governing body.
53. Per Kindersley V.C. in Thomson v. University of London, supra, note 7.
54. Supra, note 6.
55. In Canada see, for example, An Act Respecting the Memorial University of
Newfoundland R.S.N. 1970, c. 231 s. 9; University Act, R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 419s. 2.
In New Zealand, for example, see the University ofAucklandAct, 1961, c. 50 s. 5.
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what matters can properly be regarded as questions of internal
administration. Of particular interest here is the question of whether
visitorial jurisdiction extends to adjudicating on alleged procedural
unfairness, or, to put the matter another way, whether it is the
Visitor or the courts who possess the power of procedural review of
university affairs.
In the student context there are a number of cases declaring purely
academic matters - challenges to examination results and the like
- to be an internal matter for the Visitor to deal with. 6 As the
courts would not be in a position to review these matters, it makes
sense to exclude the courts and hand the matter to some other body.
Even in institutions not possessing Visitors, the courts have declined
to intervene in purely academic matters.5 There is as yet no decision
extending the Visitor's jurisdiction to matters involving procedural
fairness in the academic sphere or the disciplinary one.
In principle, it would seem possible to hold that procedural review
whilst it must necessarily be performed within the context of a uni-
versity's internal administration is not part of it. "Internal" could
easily be viewed as meaning something to do with the "essence" of a
university or involving matters unique to a university's academic
purpose. Insistence on procedural fairness is not something unique to
universities but is rather part of the general public law. As such
responsibility for ensuring it is observed should rest with the courts.
There are some suggestions, however, that the courts will not
follow this interpretation of "internal" but rather will look to see if
the subject matter is one relating to the internal administration. If it
is, then it will fall within the jurisdiction of the Visitor for all purposes
including adjudication on alleged breaches of natural justice.
Brightman J. at first instance in Herring v. Templeman5" felt the
expulsion of a student for academic reasons was within the Visitor's
jurisdiction, even though it involved alleged breaches of natural jus-
tice (in this case, that the student had not been given an opportunity
56. See for example Thomson v. University of London, supra, note 7, Thorne v.
University of London, supra, note 11 and text.
57. See Re Polten case, supra, note 12 and text.
58. [1973] 2 All E.R. 581 (Ch.). The Court of Appeal felt the question could not be
answered as the institution there was set up by trust, and was not a corporation.
Unsure of the position of the visitor in such institutions, they affirmed Brightman
J.'s decision on other grounds and declined to consider the matter. [ 1973] 3 All E.R.
569 (C.A.). See Christie, A Problem of Jurisdiction and Natural Justice (1974), 37
M.L.R. 324.
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to produce reasons for not expelling him). A Canadian case involving
an appeal against refusal of tenure has also been held to fall within
the jurisdiction of the Visitor even though it involved allegations of
breach of natural justice.59
In principle, the institution of the Visitor seems objectionable.
Attemps have been made to equate the Visitor with "a domestic
tribunal which can determine the matter informally, cheaply and
speedily". 6" This analogy is fallacious. Administrative tribunals are
created to make substantive decisions. Their procedures are reviewa-
ble in the courts. In the universities it is the universities which take
the substantive decisions - but rather than leave review of their
procedures to the courts, advocates of the visitorial jurisdiction argue
that it be given exclusively to the Visitor. It is difficult to see why
students should be denied the access to procedural review in the
courts that other citizens enjoy. It is to be hoped that the Visitor
meets the same fate in other Canadian provinces that he met in
Alberta where the legislature moved swiftly to abolish him on his
re-entry into the legal world.6
VIII. Exhaustion of Internal Remedies
The most potent bar to obtaining judicial review of university affairs
is connected with the hierarchical committee structure which exists in
most universities. Frequently, student grievances are dealt with at a
departmental level and may be appealed or reconsidered at faculty
and perhaps Senate level. Given the reluctance of the courts to
scrutinise university administration62 , they may prefer the problem to
be considered first by the university community before considering it
in the courts. This involves two separate questions. First, can a later
hearing or appeal conducted in accordance with the principles of
59. Vanek v. Governors ofAlberta, supra, note 2. The legislature in response to the
case abolished the institution of the visitor. Universities Amendment Act S.A. 1976,
c. 88; see now R.S.A. 1980, c. U-5, s. 7. A recent unsuccessful att empt to invoke the
visitorial jurisdiction arose in Casson v. University of Aston in Birmingham [ 1983] 1
All E.R. (A decision of the Lord Chancellor acting as visitor.)
60. By Megarry V.C. in Patel v. Bradford University Senate [ 1978] 1 W.L.R. 1488
at p. 1497.
61. Supra, note 59.
62. This reluctance was re-iterated in two recent university cases; see Re Paine and
University of Toronto (1981), 131 D.L.R. (3rd) 325 esp. the comments of
Weatherston J.A. at page 331 and Re Bezeau and Ontario Institute of Studies
(1982), 134 D.L.R. (3rd) 99 esp. per Galligan J. at p. 104. (he cases involved
faculty tenure appeals but both courts referred to student cases as supportive of a
general reluctance to interfere in university affairs).
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natural justice "cure" a defect or breach of natural justice in an
earlier hearing. Secondly if this is possible should the courts require
students to exhaust all possible remedies within the university before
making an application of review.
The Canadian and British courts differ widely in their views of the
problem. A Canadian university case, King v. University of Saskat-
chewan, 63 seems to lay down the general principle that a later, prop-
erly conducted appeal can cure an earlier, defective hearing. The case
involved an appeal against the refusal of a degree which eventually
reached Senate. Although Senate technically had sole responsibility
for the granting of degrees, the Supreme Court throughout treated
the process as appellate and there is no reasons to doubt that they
intended to lay down a general principle. It is fair to say, however,
that the issue was never fully considered and no reasons for the
principle were given. The result of the principle would seem to be that
a person who receives a fair, but unfavourable, consideration by an
appeal body will be denied judicial relief. Thus a student who opts for
an appeal hearing hoping that it will be favourable and thus as a
practical matter obviate the need to go to the courts, now runs the
risk, in Canada at least, that a fair but unfavourable decision pre-
cludes judicial relief.
The British courts in Leary v. National Union of Vehicle Builders64
came to a different view. Megarry J. held that as a general rule "a
failure of natural justice in the trial body cannot be cured by a
sufficiency of natural justice in the appellate body". There seemed to
be three underlying reasons for this decision. First, appellate bodies
differ in composition and approach from the trial body. In the uni-
versity context (particularly where decisions involve academic mat-
ters there is, as Dickson J. points out in his dissent in Re Harelkin and
the University of Regina6 5 "a world of difference" between faculty
bodies and Senate (and also, where the faculty is an umbrella one
such as Arts and Sciences between the department and other appel-
late bodies). The faculty (or department) is the effective decision-
maker and it is composed of people familiar with the area of work in
question, familiar perhaps with the student and especially with
63. Supra, note 21. See also Re Mclnnes and Simon Fraser University, supra note 15.
15.
64. [1971] 1 Ch. 34. See also the strong dissent of Dickson J. in Re Harelkin and
the University of Regina (1979), 96 D.L.R. (3rd) 14 which supports the British view.
65. In the Harelkin case, supra, 64.
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faculty policy and previous decisions in similar situations. It is diffi-
cult to see how a fair hearing at a higher level can compensate for
deficiences at the lower, but critical, level.
Second, at the appellate level, the student has to contend not only
with the evidence against him but also one or more decisions unfa-
vourable to his arguments. There may be a natural reluctance on the
part of appellate bodies to overturn such decisions66 - thus the
student has a more difficult task in having the decision reversed.
Frequently the burden of proof is reversed and it is the student who
has to prove the incorrectness of the earlier hearing. It is difficult,
given this, to conclude that a fair appellate hearing compensates for
the deficiencies at the initial hearing where, in many ways, it is more
important to ensure fair procedures.
These arguments seem strongly to support the idea that defects in
a hearing should not be curable by properly conducted appeals.6 7 As a
later appeal cannot rectify earlier procedural misdemeanors there
seems little point in compelling a student to exhaust internal reme-
dies. It may be that a favourable decision would remove the need to
go to court but the student should be able to choose between going to
court immediately or appealing within the university in the hope of
receiving a favourable hearing. The student might even suggest to the
appeal body that the earlier unfairness is a reason to overturn the
appeal. The choice would seem to be the student's and there would
not, in the United Kingdom, be a requirement of exhaustion of
internal or alternative remedies.66
The position in Canada seems very different, largely because of the
belief that an appeal hearing can cure earlier defects. In that setting it
becomes more important to decide if a student must first use all the
remedies offered by the university as a favourable or unfavourable
decision, so long as the appeal is fairly conducted, precludes judicial
relief. In Re Harelkin and the University of Regina69 the Supreme
66. Described by Dickson J., ibid., at p. 32 as 'the dynamic of ascending rigidity'.
67. As a caveat one should note the decision of Calvin v. Carr [1979] 2 W.L.R. 755
(P.C.) which suggests that in some circumstances an appeal might cure an earlier
defect. The court seemed to have in mind situations where the initial decision must
be given instantly as in that case which involved horse racing where a decision to
disqualify a horse had to be given on the spot. The latter 'appeal' in such instances
comprises the first full hearing. This of course is not normally the case in university
decision-making.
68. This is the conclusion reached both by De Smith, op. cit., note 46 at p. 154 and
Wade, op. cit., note 46 at p. 593-598.
69. Supra, note 64.
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Court addressed itself to the question of developing an exhaustion of
internal remedies rule within a university.
The majority of the Supreme Court decided to reject the student's
application for review and to confine him instead to pursuing an
internal appeal to the Senate. The majority first established the dis-
cretionary nature of the perogatives, rejecting arguments that this
discretion was almost non-existent where a breach of procedural
fairness had occurred.7" Having achieved this dubious position the
majority then considered whether to refuse to exercise their discretion
to grant a remedy. Beetz J. felt this issue depended on the "balance
of convenience" a concept that has never before been referred to in
the context of prerogative remedies but rather seems an import from
the private law area of interlocutory injunctions. 7 In deciding where
the balance of convenience lay, Beetz J. suggested that regard be
paid to a number of factors: procedure on appeal, composition of the
various bodies, powers and likely manner of exercise, cost, expedi-
tiousness and so on. All these factors are relevant but to the question
of what procedural fairness requires in the circumstances not to the
question of whether a remedy should be awarded. In truth, the test is
out of place here. What the courts are doing is making a final, not a
temporary judgment, on whether a person's rights to fair procedure
have been infringed. If so, a remedy should be awarded unless there is
some unusual reason why it should not. This is the traditional under-
standing of the law and there has never previously been any sugges-
tion that the enforcement of rights is subject to a "balance of
convenience".
In considering whether an appeal to a Senate was an adequate
alternative remedy, Beetz J. makes other errors of reasoning which
deserve to be noted. First, he feels the Senate appeal would be
conducted as a trial "de novo" as there was nothing to indicate that
records would be transferred from the lower to the appellate tribunal
and he felt that such records would be inadequate to hear an appeal.
Yet this is exactly what happens frequently. Large bodies such as
Senate often rely on transcripts of earlier proceedings and written
submissions. If Beetz J. is right and such material is inadequate that
70. For reasons of space, the flaws in the reasoning underlying this position, which
was forcefully dissented from by the minority, will not be considered.
71. See American Cyanamid Co. v. Ethicon Ltd. [1975] A.C. 396 (H.L.). Beetz J.
himself did not refer to this similarity; indeed he fails to give any authority or
justification for his test.
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is all the more reason for holding that an appeal to Senate is no
substitute for earlier defective hearings. Alternatively Senate would
have to change its role to that of a fact-finding rather than delibera-
tive body something it is not suited for given its size, nature and role
in the university. Such mistaken perceptions confirm the need for
detailed analysis of the particular institution in question before pres-
cribing a code of procedure. The failure of the Court to do this raises
doubts about the capacity of the courts to perform this role.
Finally, Beetz J. says that, as a lay body with no legal expertise,
the Senate would inevitably treat the appeal as a de novo hearing and
so the student would not be faced with the additional burden of
unfavourable decisions. Without noticing the contradiction, Beetz J.
in his next paragraph says even if the Senate does not hear the appeal
de novo instinctively, the Senate would be bound by law to set aside
the earlier decisions as vitiated because of the failure to accord natu-
ral justice. This predicts a detailed knowledge of the principles of
natural justice and the curative effects of appeals - something one
would not have expected of the lay tribunal that Beetz J. described in
his previous paragraph.
There is much that is unsatisfactory about the judgment in Re
Harelkin, both from the point of view of legal principle and its
knowledge of the practicalities of university decision-making. It is
however, difficult to ignore the latent, often blatant, reluctance of
the courts to review university affairs. Three British cases refused
relief, two of them after finding breaches of natural justice had
occurred. Of these only one72 is defensible as the student had secured
a place at another institution and did not wish to be reinstated so
relief was redundant. In another the court found a breach of natural
justice had occurred, but felt that no remedy should issue as the
student was guilty of the offence. 73 This seems an improper confusion
of review of the procedures used, which is all a court should do, and
consideration of the merits. The third case simply stated that there
was no breach and if there had been no remedy would issue.74
IX. Conclusions
As a study on procedural fairness in operation, the case law on
judicial review of university affairs is not encouraging. The courts
72.R. v. Aston University Senate exp. Roffey, supra, note 17.
73. Glynn v. Keele University, supra, note 27.
74. R. v. Oxford University exp. Bolchover, supra, note 28.
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have recognised the basic distinctions between the various categories
of decision. They have, for example, distinguished between trivial
and serious disciplinary matters and questions of purely subjective
academic evaluation and those involving other objectively ascertaina-
ble factors. But there is a consistent failure on the part of the courts
to carry the analysis beyond drawing these basic distinctions. The
courts have not explicitly articulated the other relevant factors or
assessed the weight to be given to the various interests. In particular,
the courts have not given guidance on the types of procedures that
they feel are required in particular circumstances.
The reasons for this reluctance to lay down guidelines for a flexible
code of fair procedure for university administration are less readily
apparent. It may be that many of the university cases arose before the
revival of judicial review or the advent of procedural fairness. It may
be that, faced with similar situations now, the courts would deal
more adequately with the issues. Unfortunately the recent case law
reveals an even greater reluctance to embark on review of university
administration. This is reflected by the resurrection in England of the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Visitor and in Canada by the develop-
ment of an exhaustion of remedies rule .75
It is not clear whether this reluctance stems from a belief that the
courts lacked the necessary knowledge and expertise to engage in the
balancing operation required by procedural fairness. This would raise
the issue of whether judicially conducted procedural review is suitable
in the more complex administrative world generally. Or the courts
might genuinely believe that universities are self-regulating commun-
ities where courts should not intervene. If this is true it seems unsatis-
factory. Apart from the narrow area of academic evaluation where
the courts do not have the capability for review, courts should act as
a safeguard against potential abuse. Due deference should be paid to
the views of university administrators in deciding whether particular
procedures are required. But this deference should not prevent the
courts from embarking on review and evaluating the university's
claims against other competing interests. Thus it seems either courts
are not capable of adequately performing the task of procedural
review or without apparent justification they are denying protection
75. For recent statements advocating judicial non-intervention in university-faculty
disputes see Re Paine and University of Toronto (1981), 12 D.L.R. (3rd) 325 at p.
331 (Ont. C.A.) and Re Bezeau and Ontario Institute for Studies (1982) 134 D.L.R.
(3rd) 99 at p. 104 (Ont. D.C.).
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to one group in society. On either view there seems little evidence of
the new approach to procedural fairness reflected in the university-
student case law.
